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I.—The Oxyrhynchus Fragments of Aeschines of Sphettus

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The dialogue *Alcibiades* of the Socratic philosopher Aeschines of Sphettus was reconstructed from the extant fragments by H. Dittmar in 1912. More fragments were subsequently recovered from papyri and were edited in Part 13 of the *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*. Two of the Oxyrhynchus fragments make a further contribution to knowledge of the *Alcibiades* and this paper indicates their significance and tries to fit them into Dittmar's reconstruction, which requires some modification.

The extant fragments of the Socratic dialogues of Aeschines of Sphettus were edited by C. F. Hermann in 1850, by H. Krauss in 1911 and more fully by H. Dittmar in 1912.¹ Aeschines wrote seven dialogues entitled *Alcibiades*, *Axiochus*, *Aspasia*, *Kallias*, *Miltiades*, *Rhion* and *Telauges*.² Eleven fragments of the *Alcibiades* were preserved in the works of Maximus of Tyre, Demetrius *περί ἐρμηνείας*, Priscian, Athenaeus and Aelius Aristides.³ Aristides,

¹ C. F. Hermann, *De Aischinis Socratici Reliquiis* (Göttingen 1850); H. Krauss, *Aischinis Socratici Reliquiae* (Leipzig 1911); H. Dittmar, *Aischines von Sphettos* (*Philologische Untersuchungen* 21; Berlin 1912); see also *RE* 1.1408. G. C. Field (*Plato and His Contemporaries* [London 1930] 146–152, 156) discusses Aeschines' dialogues, translates most of the fragments of the *Alcibiades*, and conjectures the purpose of the dialogue; his conclusions are more cautious than those of Dittmar but their tendency is the same. A. E. Taylor (*Philosophical Studies* [London 1934] 1–27) has an essay on Aeschines and translates all of the *Alcibiades* fragments. Taylor also agrees in general with Dittmar and makes conjectures regarding the topic of the dialogue. My paper is largely a note on Taylor's remark (18–19): "The meaning of the allusion to a defence of the 'vulgar man' (the *φᾶλος*) by Apollodorus can, I believe, no longer be explained." Taylor has several interesting remarks on the evidence of Aeschines as to the rank of Socrates in society and the correspondence (which he thinks to be quite close) between the Socrates of Aeschines and that of the Platonic dialogues.

² Diogenes Laertius 2.60 ff. (Dittmar, 249–250).

³ See the collection of the fragments in Dittmar, 266–274.

Cicero (*Tusc. Disp.* 3.77) and Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* 14.8) give brief indications of the outline of the *Alcibiades*. The longest fragment (frag. 1, Krauss) is found in Aelius Aristides, Oration 46.221 f. (2.292 ff. Dindorf) and furnishes sixty-two lines of this dialogue. It begins with a dialogue between Socrates and Alcibiades, but fifty-two lines are devoted to a speech of Socrates on the character of Themistocles. Themistocles and Xerxes both knew that the country whose leader was wise in counsel (σπουδαιότερος ἐν ἀρετῇ) was more likely to achieve success. Socrates shows Alcibiades Themistocles' greatness as a leader because of his σπουδαιότης ἐν ἀρετῇ and his knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Nobody of that time had as good a right to be a leader as Themistocles. Socrates states that Themistocles' success lay in his knowledge and "self-tendancy" (ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ), not in τύχη. Yet even Themistocles' knowledge was not sufficient to prevent his fall into disrepute and his banishment. He then draws the moral: Τί οὖν οἶε τοῖς τε φαύλοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐν μηδεμίᾳ ἐπιμελείᾳ ἑαυτῶν οὖσιν; Οὐ θαυμαστόν, εἰ καὶ τὰ μικρὰ δύνανται κατορθοῦν; and opposes those who think that Themistocles achieved his greatness by mere chance.

Dittmar reconstructs the *Alcibiades* of Aeschines, and in general his reconstruction seems reasonable and goes as far as is possible with the evidence at hand. The reconstruction is arrived at after a careful comparison of the representation of Alcibiades by Aeschines with the references to him in Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.12-48, with the references to Themistocles in *Memorabilia* 4.2.2-39 and with the *Alcibiades I* often attributed to Plato.⁴ The author of this last work, he concludes, used as model and source the *Alcibiades* of Aeschines as well as Xenophon and Plato.⁵ Dittmar thinks that the *Alcibiades* developed as follows:⁶ Socrates comes into the Lyceum in conversation with Alcibiades. Alcibiades remarks that he is εὐδαίμων, basing this on his wealth and high birth. Socrates shows him the worthlessness of such possessions and tries to show him that only the possession of virtue brings good fortune. The topic then becomes the καλὸς κάγαθός and εὐσέβεια is specially emphasized.

⁴ With Shorey (*What Plato Said*, 415) "it is inadvisable to dogmatise" on the authenticity of the *Alcibiades I*. The opinions of modern scholars are divided; they are summarized by Shorey, 653.

⁵ Dittmar, 144; Taylor, 17 agrees with Dittmar that the author of *Alc. I* used Aeschines' dialogue as a model.

⁶ Dittmar, 155-157.

Virtue is knowledge and knowledge requires learning and ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ. Socrates points out to Alcibiades that he (Alcibiades) has no knowledge in ethics, that he is ἀμαθής and far from good fortune; he is ἄθλιος and on the same level as the δημιουργός. Socrates indicates the advantages that knowledge and ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ bring; such a man can benefit himself, other men and his country. Alcibiades opposes this; he believes that great men achieve success φύσει. The great statesmen, he maintains, owe their greatness to nature, not to μάθησις. He cites Themistocles as an example. Conscious of his own superiority he censures Themistocles. In this censure Socrates perceives Alcibiades' jealousy of Themistocles and his secret desire to emulate him. Then in a long speech (frag. 1 Krauss) he shows the real source of Themistocles' greatness. Alcibiades perceives that he is deficient in all the necessary qualifications, gives up his opposition, breaks into tears, is now ready for instruction in ethics and entreats Socrates to help him acquire virtue. Socrates emphasizes again the real ground of Themistocles' failure — his deficiency in εὐσέβεια. Before and after this speech Socrates talks of his connection with Alcibiades. He answers the charge that he corrupted Alcibiades; he concludes with remarks on his love for Alcibiades.⁷

In Part 13 of the *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* Grenfell and Hunt edited and annotated nineteen new fragments of the *Alcibiades*,⁸ of which only six are large enough to be of any value and the longest continuous passage is less than twenty lines. Identification of the fragments with the *Alcibiades* of Aeschines is established by the fact that Oxyrhynchus fragments 5, 6, 7 contain after parts of five new lines Krauss's fragment 2, immediately followed by his fragment 1, as he had conjectured. Oxyrhynchus fragments 1 and 4 contribute further information concerning the nature of the *Alcibiades* of Aeschines.⁹

⁷ On the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades as it was portrayed by Aeschines see Taylor, 13–15; on τέχνη and θεία μοῖρα in frag. 3 Krauss see my dissertation, *The History and Development of the Concept of θεία μοῖρα and θεία τύχη down to and including Plato* (Chicago 1940) 43–44.

⁸ *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, part 13 (ed. Grenfell and Hunt; London 1919) 88–94 (papyrus no. 1608).

⁹ Frags. 2 and 3 contribute nothing of value, except that the reference to the "defence" of Apollodorus (ἀπολογεῖσθαι, frag. 4, line 36) may pick up the ἀπολογία of frag. 3, lines 28–29. Suggested reconstructions of words here and elsewhere in this paper are those of Grenfell and Hunt.

Oxyrhynchus fragment 1 probably begins, according to Grenfell and Hunt,¹⁰ with a question of Socrates: "Would you be willing to have behaved to your parents as Themistocles is said to have behaved to his?" Alcibiades replies "Hush, Socrates!" Socrates then asks "Do you think that men have to be unmusical before they are musical and unskilled in riding before they are skilled?" Grenfell and Hunt then quote Burnet's suggestion that "this was part of an argument intended to show that Themistocles did not achieve what he did *φύσει*, which Alcibiades considered sufficient for himself. Since Themistocles was so unsatisfactory in his youth he must have become great and acquired *ἐπιστήμη* by care and practice."¹¹ The editors think that the reference to Themistocles here may have been the first occurrence of his name in the dialogue; this certainly seems possible and the order of the fragments with which we are dealing is therefore Oxyrhynchus fragments 1-4, 5-7 (5-7 from line 82 on = fragments 2, 1 Krauss).

Oxyrhynchus fragment 4 continues, in the translation of Grenfell and Hunt: ". . . and Apollodorus also to make a good defence on behalf of the mean (*ὑπὲρ τοῦ φαύλου*). — But, he replied, there is this point; I should not have thought that Themistocles was disinherited by his father; for such conduct betokens a mean (*φαύλου*) character and reaches the height of folly, when a person is involved in such quarrels and in the most violent enmity with his parents, which even a child would find a way of avoiding. — Did you think it so small-minded, Alcibiades, said I, to be filled with hatred of one's parents that. . . ." Of the fragment after line 52 only a few words can be determined, but lines 56-57 contain the word *φau[λοτάτων?]*. The editors then quote Burnet's remark that "'Alcibiades may well have been relying on his natural gifts, so that the question of *κάλλος* arose. Apollodorus may well have championed the cause of "the ugly" (e.g. Socrates); for he certainly stands for the more cynical aspect of Socraticism as appears from the beginning of the *Symposium*.'" Burnet here seems to take *φαῖλος* in the sense of "ugly." But in this fragment the word in both of its occurrences rather indicates the sense of "mean" or "base" and Grenfell and Hunt so translate it. Apollodorus puts up a defence of "the mean." The disinheriting of Themistocles, Alcibiades thinks, indicates that he had a "mean" and foolish

¹⁰ Grenfell and Hunt, 93.

¹¹ Field, 148 and Taylor, 18 agree with Burnet.

nature, if he acted in such a way to his parents that he was disinherited by his father. The third occurrence of φαῦλος in lines 56–57 is therefore probably to be taken in the same sense.

Dittmar works out in detail the parallels between Aeschines' *Alcibiades* and *Memorabilia* 4.2.2–39 where the question is raised (sec. 2) whether Themistocles became σπουδαῖος, φύσει or μαθήσει.¹² Here Socrates shows Euthydemus (sec. 2) that it is absurd to suppose that the most difficult of all arts, the art of statesmanship, comes to men by nature and that one can achieve success ἀνευ παρασκευῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας (sec. 6). Socrates shows that Euthydemus has ἀμαθία in ethical questions (the δημιουργοί are in the same position) and that the man who is ignorant of ethics is ἀνδραποδῶδης (sec. 22). The same is true of a state (sec. 29). If Euthydemus does not know good and evil he admits that he must be τῶν ἀνδραποδῶν φαυλότερος (sec. 31). In section 39 Euthydemus recognizes his φαυλότης and his ignorance in ethical matters and realizes that he is a slave; he thereupon decides to follow Socrates and to take his advice. The parallels between this passage and the *Alcibiades* of Aeschines as outlined by Dittmar are immediately noticeable.¹³ Here, then, in a passage which parallels the outline of the *Alcibiades*, φαυλότης is specifically mentioned; it means "mean" or "base," like the δημιουργοί¹⁴ or the slaves and the man who is "mean" is contrasted with the man who practises παρασκευή and ἐπιμέλεια.

Fragment 1 Krauss contains, as noted above, a further occurrence of φαῦλος. Themistocles' knowledge was not sufficient to protect him from disgrace and dishonor. Socrates asks "What then do you think about the case of mean men and those who have no ἐπιμέλεια ἐαυτῶν? Is it not surprising if they are able to accomplish even the most insignificant of reforms?" Here again the φαῦλος is contrasted with those who have ἐπιμέλεια ἐαυτῶν.

There are therefore in the Oxyrhynchus fragments three references to φαῦλος, two further ones in a passage in Xenophon which closely parallels the *Alcibiades* and another one in the long fragment of the *Alcibiades* in Aristides. All employ the word in the same

¹² Dittmar, 124 ff.

¹³ Dittmar, 154–155 arranges the parallel concepts of Aeschines, Xenophon and *Alc. I* in three columns and notes the similarities.

¹⁴ Φαῦλος is used of the δημιουργός or of οἱ πολλοί frequently by Plato; cf. *Gorg.* 483B–C, *Resp.* 431C, *Leg.* 746D; = μοχθηρός, *Gorg.* 486B, 521C; opposed to ἀγαθός, *Prt.* 326E, 327B–C, *Leg.* 922D; of slaves, *Cri.* 52D.

sense. The fragments taken together confirm Dittmar's conjecture that fragment 1 Krauss was preceded by a discussion of *φauλότης*:¹⁵ "die gleichung, ἐπιμέλεια αὐτοῦ mache die menschen, wie intellektuell, so moralisch zu ἀγαθοί, der mensch ohne ἐπιμέλεια αὐτοῦ dagegen sei φαῦλος, muss schon vorher gefunden worden sein." However, Dittmar suggests that this reference to *φauλότης* occurred in the course of a discussion of *καλοκάγαθία*; the Oxyrhynchus fragments indicate that in place of this general discussion, or in addition to it, *φauλότης* was mentioned in reference to the character of Themistocles; there was a discussion of the *φauλότης* of Themistocles.

The Oxyrhynchus fragments of the *Alcibiades* indicate that Socrates elicits from Alcibiades the admission that Themistocles in his youth was *φαῦλος*, a very ordinary type of youth, no different from the *δημιουργός* or the slave. Apollodorus defended him, possibly on the ground that his disinheriting by his father occurred when he was young and foolish and that he changed later. Socrates goes on to show that this was indeed the case; he outlines the distinguished career of Themistocles and shows that he became *σπουδαιότερος ἐν ἀρετῇ* (frag. 1 Krauss, lines 24, 27),¹⁶ practised *ἐπιμέλεια αὐτοῦ* and acquired *ἐπιστήμη* (line 50).

At the end of fragment 1 Krauss, Socrates states that *ἐπιστήμη*, not *τύχη*, was responsible for Themistocles' success, that *τύχη* does not come to good and bad alike, ἀλλὰ . τοῖς καλοῖς καγαθοῖς εὐσεβεστέροις γε οὖσιν ἀμείνω τὰ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ὑπάρχειν. The insertion of the limiting phrase *εὐσεβεστέροις γε οὖσιν* seems to refer back to a previous discussion of *εὐσέβεια*. Dittmar thinks that in the discussion of *καλοκάγαθία* which he supposes to have been in the dialogue, the part of *εὐσέβεια* must have been emphasized,¹⁷ and that the reference to it was drawn in because Socrates was aware of Alcibiades' deficiency in this quality, as is shown by Aeschines' characterization of him in Aristides: ὁ γ' Αἰσχίνης φησὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς δώδεκα θεοῖς ἥδιστα ἐπετίμησε.¹⁸ Here Dittmar uses the term *εὐσέβεια* in its usual sense of "reverence for the gods." But, as we now know from the Oxyrhynchus fragments, this section of the dialogue deals with Themistocles and the conclusions are drawn from the char-

¹⁵ Dittmar, 105.

¹⁶ *Φαῦλος* is used frequently by Plato as the opposite of *σπουδαῖος*; cf. *Phdr.* 242C, 261B, *Resp.* 423C-D, 519D, *Leg.* 814E. Cf. also Xen. *Cyr.* 2.2.24; Isoc. *Ad Demon.* 1 and 48; Arist. *Poet.* 1448A, 1449B, 1461A.

¹⁷ See pp. 2 f. above; Dittmar, 156.

¹⁸ Aristides, 46.285 (2.369 Dindorf); Dittmar, 106, note 31.

acter of Themistocles; εὐσέβεια must have been mentioned *in connection with Themistocles* and with the references to his disinheritance which, we know, was mentioned prior to the long speech of Socrates. Oxyrhynchus fragment 4 ends with the question of Socrates (in the suggested translation of Grenfell and Hunt): "Did you think it so small-minded (μικρόν), Alcibiades, . . . to be filled with hatred of one's parents that. . . ." ¹⁹ I venture to suggest that it may rather be translated "Did you think it such a small thing, Alcibiades, . . . to be filled with hatred of one's parents that . . ." and I would conjecture that the sentence continued somewhat as follows: ". . . you consider such an attitude to be merely that of an ordinary (τοῦ [ἐπιτυχ?]όντος) man and conclude that he is φαῦλος?" ²⁰ He is more than that; he is τῶν φαν[λοτάτων?] (lines 56–57) and brings disgrace on his city (πόλιν, line 58) and on his parents; he is even, I would say, ἀσεβέστατος." Here εὐσέβεια, the opposite of ἀσέβεια, would mean, as it often does in Greek, "reverence for one's parents" and is equivalent to the Latin *pietas*. ²¹ The story of the disinheriting of Themistocles by his father shows, according to Socrates, that he was φαῦλος and ἀσεβής in his youth, and that he acquired ἐπιστήμη and also εὐσέβεια by σπουδαιότης ἐν ἀρετῇ and by ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ. The final reference to εὐσέβεια at the end of the long speech of Socrates takes us back to this emphasis on reverence in Themistocles and to his conversion.

Dittmar's reconstruction of the *Alcibiades* seems valid down to the point at which Socrates points out that virtue alone brings prosperity. The dialogue then probably continued with Socrates' indication that virtue is knowledge and that knowledge requires μάθησις and ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ. Alcibiades opposes this and maintains that the statesmen owe their achievements to φύσις, not μάθησις; he mentions Themistocles as an example. Socrates elicits from Alcibiades the admission that Themistocles in his youth was φαῦλος and tries to indicate that he acquired ἐπιστήμη and εὐσέβεια. Apollodorus defends Themistocles. Alcibiades does not admit Apollodorus' defence; he feels his own superiority and censures Themistocles. Then, with the section represented by fragments 2,1

¹⁹ Grenfell and Hunt, 93; cf. above, p. 4. Taylor, 11 translates μικρόν "shocking" (and conjectures the rest of the sentence "that anyone and everyone must <avoid> it"). I cannot see how this meaning can be taken from μικρόν.

²⁰ Cf. *Cra.* 390D, οὐδὲ φαύλων ἀνδρῶν οὐδὲ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων.

²¹ It is so used, for example, in *Resp.* 615c; cf. Pind. *Pyth.* 6.23–27, Soph. *El.* 968.

Krauss, Socrates outlines Themistocles' career and shows that he acquired ἐπιστήμη and hence ἀρετή by σπουδαιότης and by ἐπιμέλεια ἐαυτοῦ. Alcibiades draws the correct conclusion, that he himself is φαῦλος, with no ἐπιμέλεια ἐαυτοῦ; he is ἀμαθής and ἄθλιος and no better than a δημιουργός. The dialogue concludes with the repentance of Alcibiades, and Socrates thereupon talks to an unknown audience about his relationship with Alcibiades.

As for the framework of the dialogue, the ἦν δ' ἐγώ of Oxyrhynchus fragment 4 (lines 49–50) and the use of the first person again by Socrates in line 55 of fragment 1 Krauss indicate that both the Oxyrhynchus fragments and the fragment preserved in Aristides belong to a section of the *Alcibiades* in which Socrates reports a conversation with Alcibiades and speaks later (fragments 3,4 Krauss) of his relationship with Alcibiades. Dittmar thought that it was unnecessary to suppose that there was a third participant in the conversation, but the Oxyrhynchus fragments apparently indicate that there was a third person present, Apollodorus. He takes part in the conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades, and the later remarks of Socrates were perhaps addressed to an audience of which he was a member.²² We are given no clue as to the nature of the framework of the beginning of the *Alcibiades*. There may have been a preliminary scene in which Alcibiades himself was present; or Socrates may have been the narrator from the beginning, describing to Apollodorus and others his relationship with Alcibiades. For such a dialogue Aeschines had the *Charmides* and *Lysis* of Plato as models.

²² Taylor, 19 has shown that this Apollodorus cannot, for reasons of chronology, be the Apollodorus of the *Symposium*, *Apology* and *Phaedo*, as was suggested by Burnet.